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submarine as the major elements of that
nation’s independent nuclear deterrent.
Although he glosses over it, he was
one of the few to make the transition
successfully into higher-level nuclear
management, which took him right
to the pinnacle of his specialization.
He therefore can offer his readers an
almost unique perspective into the
world of nuclear engineering, from the
deckplates right through to higher-level
policy making. Paradoxically, though,
his illustrious career almost was cut off
at the knees when his earnest, and in
some ways naive, early efforts attracted
some unwarranted judgment from
colleagues with a less-than-nurturing
disposition. How many others of us
suffered similar, “there but for the
grace of God” moments like these?
Endowed with a wry sense of humor
and a literary bent, Thompson paints at
times a disquieting picture of the darker,
human side of life in submarines. His
characters are portrayed vividly, and
anyone who has served will recognize
their types instantly. Some may take
exception with what, at times, seems
a lengthy preoccupation with his own
youthful insecurities, so the book will
not be everyone’s cup of tea, focusing as
it does on the author’s personal experiences and observations as opposed to
the larger policy issues of the day. That
said, the book does in passing provide
some useful insights into the development of the Tigerfish wire-guided torpedo and the administration of nuclear
safety directives at the higher command
level. There are also memorable, lighter
moments, such as the vivid description
of “corporate constipation,” caused by
the failure of the sewage treatment plant,
as well as the many mishaps that inevitably befall mariners who essentially
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are deprived of their senses with regard
to their immediate surroundings.
In sum, this is a book for those
interested in knowing what it was
like to live in submarines during the
Cold War. Those seeking coverage of
matters of policy and strategy probably
will be better served elsewhere.
ANGUS ROSS

India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval
Dominance in the Indian Ocean, ed. David Brewster. New Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 2018. 348
pages. $40.99.

Americans often think of the vast
Indian Ocean as the “rear area” of the
Pacific Ocean—a featureless expanse
notable mainly for the goods, services,
and military forces that traverse it. The
view from New Delhi and Beijing is
profoundly different. Beijing recognizes
that the flow of energy, raw materials,
and finished goods across the Indian
Ocean is essential to China’s economic
success. Chairman Xi Jinping’s One Belt,
One Road (OBOR) initiative is, in part,
a strategic investment in securing these
sea lines of communication. In just over
a decade, the People’s Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) has gone from being an
occasional visitor to the Indian Ocean
to a constantly deployed presence,
supported by its first formal overseas
base, at Djibouti. The Indian Ocean will
become, as one Chinese scholar writes,
“a normal region for the PLAN’s combat
reach in the future” (p. 94). India,
traditionally the dominant regional
power, views these developments with
concern, even as it considers its own
interests in the traditionally Chinesedominated areas of the western Pacific.

1

Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 3, Art. 16

In response, David Brewster, a specialist
in Indo-Pacific maritime security at
the Australian National University,
has assembled Indian, Australian,
Chinese, and American experts to
consider the maritime trajectory of
the region. Indian scholars make up
the majority of the contributors, while
the Australian authors offer views
influenced by the unique position of
their nation: politically close to the
United States, economically tied to
China, and physically at the crossroads
between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
As the subtitle suggests, competition
is an assumed reality throughout the
thirteen collected essays. Through
the diverse views in this volume, the
complexity underlying this competition
emerges—and with it a discussion of
why both India and China struggle to
understand, much less assuage, each
other’s suspicions. On the Indian side,
intellectual understanding of China’s
genuine interests in the region collides
with an “Indian Monroe Doctrine”
dating to the administration of Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minster.
Unclear and inconsistently articulated,
it remains an idea that, if “not actually a
policy . . . is at least a preferred objective” of Indian policy makers (p. 20).
The Indian view of Chinese maritime
activity also is influenced by ongoing
conflict with China over land borders
and a perception that China has worked
to minimize India’s rightful role in
multiple international organizations.
Meanwhile, contributions from Indian,
American, and Australian scholars are
particularly harsh in describing China’s
failure to consider the suspicion and
resistance that Chinese maritime expansion has produced. India scholar Pramit
Pal Chaudhuri quotes former Indian
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national security advisor Shivshankar
Menon’s characterization of China as
an “autistic superpower”—unable, by
its very nature, to understand India’s
concerns (p. 61). American John Garver
asserts that a constructed narrative of
national exceptionalism and peaceful
Ming dynasty voyages of discovery limits
China’s ability to understand India’s
apprehensions about China’s rise as a
naval power. Australian Rory Medcalf
describes official and unofficial Chinese
explanations of its Indian Ocean presence as being so conspicuously inconsistent with regional perceptions that they
themselves contribute to suspicions.
Calling India “oversensitive,” Yunnan
University economics professor Zhu
Li offers a case study in that narrative.
Asserting that OBOR is an international,
rather than a Chinese-led, initiative,
he outlines the essential choice being
offered to India—since it cannot stop
the OBOR initiative, it should partner
with China and claim a slice of the
economic benefits. You Ji from the
University of Macau, in contrast, offers
a blunt vision of the Chinese military
role in the Indian Ocean. Noting that
the 2015 revision to China’s National
Defense Strategy calls for “projecting
battles far away from China’s homeland,”
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is
working to extend its “war fighting into
the global commons” (pp. 91–92). In this
context, he asserts that “the PLA’s land
reclamation in the Spratlys was meant
to . . . establish forward deployment en
route to the Indian Ocean” (p. 96).
Nonetheless, Darshana Baruah describes
India’s evolving maritime domain awareness strategy as a response to issues
beyond just China. Terrorism and the
proliferation of advanced naval capabilities in the region have pushed India
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toward new partnerships, especially with
Southeast Asia and Japan. While promising, they face the significant challenge of
what Baruah diplomatically calls India’s
“history of working in isolation” (p. 172).
If, as one Australian scholar asserts, “the
great game in the Indian Ocean is still
in its early phases,” it will be increasingly important for the United States to
understand the Indian Ocean region and
its residents (p. 232). Students and specialists will find India and China at Sea a
succinct and well-crafted overview of the
disparate voices influencing maritime
competition in this vital ocean region.
DALE C. RIELAGE

To Master the Boundless Sea: The U.S. Navy, the
Marine Environment, and the Cartography of
Empire, by Jason W. Smith. Chapel Hill: Univ.
of North Carolina Press, 2018. 280 pages. $35.

Scholars long have understood the
power of the map. In To Master the
Boundless Sea Jason W. Smith explains
and explores the power of the nautical
chart, masterfully weaving his observations into the history of the U.S. Navy.
It is an exceptional work, strong in its
scholarship, and boasting a compelling—at times lyrical—narrative.
Smith’s book follows a chronological
approach, culminating in the years
following the Spanish-American
War—the presumed height of the
American empire; more-modern
hydrographic activities are mentioned
only in passing. Major themes include
the interrelationship between commerce and the Navy, bureaucratic
rivalries within the Navy and with
other government agencies, the
linkages between hydrography and U.S.
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imperialism, and the evolution of the
nautical chart into a weapon of war.
To some degree, hydrography would
seem to be—and is—a natural adjunct
to the naval service. No environment is
more dangerous to mariners than coastal
and shallow waters; accurate charts are
a necessity to avoid deadly groundings.
Shallow-water craft, whether engaged
in smuggling or combat operations,
if provided with accurate depth and
current information, can bedevil larger
foes who lack that local knowledge.
A chart—an accurate one—makes
this knowledge exportable. However,
such knowledge does not come easily; Smith details the painstaking and
backbreaking repetitive work, usually
conducted by sailors and junior officers,
needed to gather these data. This
was work for engineers, not poets.
However, as Smith notes, hydrography—
as part of the larger science of oceanography—always has involved more than
engineering. At least in its early stages,
understanding the coastlines of distant
shores also involved understanding
the nature of the peoples who lived on
those shores. This required abilities and
skills associated with anthropologists;
linguists; and, when these meetings
became confrontations, military officers.
The dangers of early hydrographic work
were considerable, sometimes deadly.
Smith also highlights tensions
between naval hydrographers and
the wider community of scientists.
Naval officers were then and are now
essentially pragmatists. They do not lack
for curiosity or imagination, but they
energize those traits for the attainment
of a practical objective, such as a
knowledge of safe passages or the best
sailing directions. While a generalization, it can be asserted that mariners,
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